If you are preparing for your first clearance investigation, transitioning between positions at different levels, or navigating the current Trusted Workforce 2.0 reforms, understanding how the levels, tiers, and authorities fit together is essential. This guide covers the complete framework.
- Three classification levels under E.O. 13526
- Above Top Secret — SCI and SAP
- Security clearance vs. public trust suitability
- Investigation Tiers 1-5 under Federal Investigative Standards
- Adjudication under SEAD 4 guidelines
- Reciprocity between agencies
- Trusted Workforce 2.0 and the reform landscape
- Frequently asked questions
The clearance system has three layered structures that employees often confuse. First, the classification level of information — Confidential, Secret, Top Secret — reflects potential damage from disclosure. Second, the clearance level of an individual — Confidential, Secret, Top Secret — authorizes access to the corresponding information. Third, the investigation tier — Tier 1 through Tier 5 — represents the depth and scope of the background investigation that produced the clearance. A position requires a specific clearance level, which requires a specific investigation tier, which requires a specific form (SF-85, SF-85P, or SF-86). Above Top Secret are specialized access controls (SCI, SAP) that require TS-level clearance as a prerequisite plus separate indoctrination or briefing. A different framework — public trust determinations under 5 CFR Part 731 — covers non-sensitive positions and is separate from national security clearances. In 2026, the system is in transition: Trusted Workforce 2.0 is consolidating the five-tier model toward three tiers, NBIS has replaced e-QIP with eApp, continuous vetting is replacing periodic reinvestigations, and reciprocity processes are expanding. Understanding both the current framework and the transition dynamics helps you navigate clearance processes in practice.
Section I Three classification levels under E.O. 13526
Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," issued December 29, 2009, established the current framework for classification of national security information. The Order defines three classification levels based on the severity of potential damage from unauthorized disclosure.
Confidential — damage to national security
Under E.O. 13526 Section 1.2(a)(3), information is classified Confidential when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. Typical examples:
- Administrative information that reveals routine operations or internal procedures
- Technical specifications of systems that are not highly sensitive
- Personnel information that could identify specific assignments or capabilities
- Certain budget information showing funding levels for non-critical programs
A Confidential clearance authorizes access to Confidential information only. Positions requiring Confidential access are relatively few in the modern federal workforce — most positions either require no clearance (non-sensitive) or require Secret or higher.
Secret — serious damage to national security
Under E.O. 13526 Section 1.2(a)(2), information is classified Secret when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security. Typical examples:
- Military plans, weapons capabilities, or intelligence methods
- Foreign government information shared under protection agreements
- Cryptographic information
- Specific operational details of national security programs
- Intelligence activities, sources, or methods
A Secret clearance is the most common level in the federal workforce. Positions with Secret access exist across DoD, DHS, State, Commerce, Energy, Treasury, Justice, and many other departments. A Secret clearance authorizes access to Confidential and Secret information.
Top Secret — exceptionally grave damage
Under E.O. 13526 Section 1.2(a)(1), information is classified Top Secret when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Typical examples:
- Vital defense plans and military strategies
- Intelligence about other nations' capabilities, intentions, or vulnerabilities
- Compartmented intelligence operations (covered additionally by SCI)
- Information whose disclosure would compromise strategic national interests
- Cryptologic systems and methods of the highest sensitivity
A Top Secret clearance authorizes access to Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret information. Positions with TS access exist primarily in the Intelligence Community, DoD combatant commands, senior leadership positions at most agencies, and specialized program offices.
Classification authority and declassification
Under E.O. 13526 Section 1.3, classification authority is limited to specific officials designated by the President or agency heads. Most classification decisions are made by Original Classification Authorities (OCAs) at various levels. Derivative classification occurs when existing classified information is incorporated into new documents.
Classified information is subject to systematic declassification after specific time periods (typically 10, 25, or in some cases 50 or more years) unless exempted for specific national security reasons. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) oversees the declassification process.
DOE Q and L clearances
The Department of Energy uses parallel clearance designations for nuclear-related information under the Atomic Energy Act:
- Q clearance — equivalent to Top Secret in scope, providing access to Top Secret Restricted Data (TS/RD) and Top Secret Formerly Restricted Data (TS/FRD)
- L clearance — equivalent to Secret in scope, providing access to Secret Restricted Data (S/RD) and Confidential Restricted Data (C/RD)
Q and L clearances are administered through DOE's Office of Departmental Personnel Security rather than through DCSA. Reciprocity between DOE Q/L clearances and DoD/IC TS/Secret clearances is structured but not automatic — agency-specific requirements often apply.
Section II Above Top Secret — SCI and SAP
Above Top Secret are specialized access control systems that require TS-level clearance as a baseline but add program-specific or compartment-specific controls.
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
Sensitive Compartmented Information, governed by Director of National Intelligence (DNI) authorities and ICD 704, covers intelligence information related to sources, methods, or analytical processes. SCI is divided into compartments — specific categories of intelligence information that require separate indoctrination beyond baseline TS clearance.
Common SCI control markings include:
- HCS (HUMINT Control System) — human intelligence sources
- SI (Special Intelligence) — signals intelligence
- TK (TALENT KEYHOLE) — imagery intelligence
- G (Gamma) — specific highly sensitive SIGINT
A "TS/SCI" clearance means the individual holds a Top Secret clearance and has been indoctrinated into one or more SCI compartments. An individual may hold TS without SCI; the reverse (SCI without TS) is not possible.
SCI indoctrination typically requires a polygraph examination (counterintelligence or full scope). The polygraph is conducted at the agency's security office using certified examiners. Polygraph examinations may be lifestyle polygraphs covering personal conduct (criminal activity, illegal drug use, unauthorized disclosures) or counterintelligence polygraphs focused specifically on intelligence-related concerns.
Special Access Programs (SAP)
Special Access Programs, governed by E.O. 13526 Section 4.3 and DoD Instruction 5205.07, are programs established to protect information whose protection requires controls beyond standard TS and SCI protections. SAP categories:
- Acknowledged SAP — the existence of the program is acknowledged though specifics are protected
- Unacknowledged SAP (USAP) — the existence of the program is itself classified
- Waived SAP — certain Congressional notification requirements are waived for specific programs
SAP access requires read-on to the specific program, in addition to baseline TS clearance. Individuals may be read in to one or more SAPs over the course of their career. SAP access is strictly compartmented — being cleared into one SAP does not grant access to other SAPs.
Polygraph requirements
Polygraph examinations are required for:
- Most SCI indoctrinations (especially in intelligence agencies — CIA, NSA, NRO, NGA, DIA)
- Certain SAP programs
- Specific positions within DoD, DHS, and Department of Justice
- Certain positions in military intelligence components
Polygraph results are not themselves a binary pass/fail — the results are one factor considered in adjudication. Adverse polygraph reactions can trigger expanded interviews and investigation but do not automatically disqualify. Inconclusive or deceptive readings typically result in follow-up examinations or resolution through investigation.
Access controls in practice
A cleared individual's access portfolio may include multiple components:
- Baseline national security clearance (Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret)
- SCI compartments (if applicable)
- SAP read-ons (if applicable)
- Agency-specific accesses (e.g., NATO, COSMIC Top Secret, AWACS-specific)
- Need-to-know within the individual's specific work assignments
"Need to know" is a separate requirement from clearance level — even an individual with TS/SCI/SAP access cannot access classified information without a legitimate official need related to their duties.
Section III Security clearance vs. public trust suitability
The federal personnel vetting system has two distinct evaluation frameworks that employees often confuse. Understanding the difference is essential because they have different authorities, standards, and consequences.
National security clearance framework
Security clearances address the risk of harm to national security from unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Authorities:
- E.O. 12968 — Access to Classified Information (1995, as amended) — governs eligibility for access
- E.O. 13526 — Classified National Security Information (2009) — governs classification
- E.O. 10450 — Security Requirements for Government Employment (1953) — foundational authority for security determinations
- 5 CFR Part 732 — National Security Positions — establishes position designation requirements
- SEAD 4 — Security Executive Agent Directive 4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (2017)
The form used is SF-86 (Questionnaire for National Security Positions). Investigations are Tier 3 (Secret) or Tier 5 (Top Secret / SCI). The Security Executive Agent is the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) under E.O. 13467 as amended.
Public trust suitability framework
Public trust determinations address the risk of harm to the integrity or efficiency of federal service from positions with specific risk profiles. Authorities:
- 5 CFR Part 731 — Suitability — governs suitability for employment in non-sensitive positions
- E.O. 13467 — Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness, and Credentialing (2008, as amended)
- Trusted Workforce 2.0 framework — governmentwide consolidation of vetting processes
The form used is SF-85P (Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions) or SF-85 (for Low Risk positions). Investigations are Tier 1 (Low Risk), Tier 2 (Moderate Risk), or Tier 4 (High Risk). The Suitability Executive Agent is the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
Key distinctions
| Dimension | Security Clearance | Public Trust |
|---|---|---|
| Risk evaluated | Harm to national security | Harm to agency integrity/efficiency |
| Application form | SF-86 | SF-85 or SF-85P |
| Adjudicative guidelines | SEAD 4 (13 guidelines) | 5 CFR 731.202 (8 factors) |
| Executive agent | DNI (Security Executive Agent) | OPM (Suitability Executive Agent) |
| Investigation tiers | Tier 3, Tier 5 | Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 |
| Appeal rights | Limited; Egan precludes MSPB review | MSPB appeal available |
Positions requiring both
Some positions require both a public trust designation and a security clearance. For example, a high-risk public trust position that also requires Secret clearance involves both Tier 4 and Tier 3 considerations. In practice, the higher-tier investigation typically satisfies the lower — a Tier 5 investigation for TS/SCI generally covers the suitability questions that would have been addressed by a Tier 4 public trust investigation.
Suitability vs. clearance decisions
Decisions under the two frameworks can differ. An individual who passes a suitability determination may still be denied a clearance because the standards differ. An individual denied a clearance may still be suitable for non-sensitive employment. The frameworks address overlapping but distinct concerns. See Workplace Topic 38 on Suitability for detailed coverage of the public trust framework.
Section IV Investigation Tiers 1-5 under Federal Investigative Standards
The 2012 Federal Investigative Standards established the current five-tier investigation structure, replacing the older NACLC/BI/SSBI terminology. Each tier corresponds to specific position sensitivity and clearance requirements.
Tier 1 — Low Risk Non-Sensitive
Tier 1 investigations cover low-risk non-sensitive positions, including HSPD-12 credentialing for federal employees and contractors. Key features:
- Investigation type — National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI) or Tier 1-specific successor
- Scope — 5 years (employment, residence, education)
- Form — SF-85 (Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions)
- Typical turnaround — 30-60 days under current DCSA timelines
- Reinvestigation — formerly every 15 years; transitioning to continuous vetting
Tier 1 is required for most federal employment positions that do not involve classified information or sensitive duties. HSPD-12 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials for federal facility access typically require at minimum a Tier 1 investigation.
Tier 2 — Moderate Risk Public Trust
Tier 2 investigations cover moderate-risk public trust positions. Key features:
- Investigation type — Moderate Background Investigation (MBI) or successor Tier 2 investigation
- Scope — 5-7 years depending on specific elements
- Form — SF-85P
- Typical turnaround — 60-120 days
- Reinvestigation — historically every 5 years; transitioning to continuous vetting
Tier 2 positions typically involve moderate risk to the integrity of federal service — financial management positions, information technology positions with access to sensitive information, positions with access to personally identifiable information (PII).
Tier 3 — Non-Critical Sensitive and Secret
Tier 3 investigations cover non-critical sensitive positions and Secret clearances. Key features:
- Investigation type — Tier 3 investigation (formerly NACLC — National Agency Check with Law and Credit)
- Scope — 10 years for key elements (employment, residence, education, criminal records)
- Form — SF-86
- Typical turnaround — 60-120 days under current timelines
- Reinvestigation — formerly every 10 years; transitioning to continuous vetting
Tier 3 is the most common investigation tier for cleared federal positions. The investigation includes national agency checks, local law enforcement checks, credit checks, and verification of employment, residence, and education.
Tier 4 — High Risk Public Trust
Tier 4 investigations cover high-risk public trust positions. Key features:
- Investigation type — Tier 4 investigation (formerly Background Investigation — BI)
- Scope — 7-10 years depending on specific elements
- Form — SF-85P (with additional modules for certain positions)
- Typical turnaround — 90-180 days
- Reinvestigation — historically every 5 years; transitioning to continuous vetting
Tier 4 positions include senior financial management roles, positions with broad access to sensitive operational information, and positions with significant public-facing responsibility. Tier 4 is typically used for positions that are not classified but involve substantial trust.
Tier 5 — Critical Sensitive, Special Sensitive, Top Secret, SCI
Tier 5 investigations cover critical sensitive and special sensitive positions, Top Secret clearances, and SCI access. Key features:
- Investigation type — Tier 5 investigation (formerly SSBI — Single Scope Background Investigation)
- Scope — 10 years or to age 18 (whichever is shorter)
- Form — SF-86
- Field interviews — required with references, neighbors, coworkers, supervisors
- Foreign coverage — detailed review of foreign contacts, travel, and financial interests
- Subject interview — in-person interview with the applicant
- Typical turnaround — 120-240+ days (improving under TW 2.0 and NBIS)
- Reinvestigation — formerly every 5 years; transitioning to continuous vetting
- Polygraph — may be required for SCI indoctrination or specific agency positions
Tier 5 is the most extensive investigation routinely conducted. Field investigators conduct in-person interviews with individuals who have known the applicant personally over the past 10 years, covering all aspects of personal, professional, and financial life.
Current transition — from five tiers to three
Under Trusted Workforce 2.0, the Performance Accountability Council has proposed consolidating the five-tier model into three tiers:
- High Tier (consolidating former Tiers 4 and 5) — High Risk Public Trust, DOE Q, Top Secret, SCI, Critical Sensitive, Special Sensitive
- Moderate Tier (consolidating former Tiers 2 and 3) — Moderate Risk Public Trust, Confidential, Secret, Non-Critical Sensitive
- Low Tier (former Tier 1) — Low Risk Non-Sensitive, HSPD-12 Credentialing
Implementation of the three-tier model is contingent on full deployment of NBIS. As of early 2026, DoD projects major NBIS development completion by end of fiscal year 2027. During the transition, legacy five-tier terminology remains in wide use.
Clearance & Position Requirements Analyzer
Identify your required clearance level, investigation tier, expected timeline, and reciprocity options based on your position and existing clearance status.
Section V Adjudication under SEAD 4 guidelines
After an investigation is completed, adjudication is the process of evaluating the collected information against established standards to determine whether the individual should be granted, denied, or conditionally approved for the clearance.
SEAD 4 — National Security Adjudicative Guidelines
Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (SEAD 4), issued in 2017 by the Director of National Intelligence, establishes the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines used for all federal security clearance determinations. SEAD 4 identifies 13 guidelines:
- Guideline A — Allegiance to the United States
- Guideline B — Foreign Influence (contacts and ties to foreign entities)
- Guideline C — Foreign Preference (acting to benefit a foreign country)
- Guideline D — Sexual Behavior (conduct creating vulnerability to coercion)
- Guideline E — Personal Conduct (reliability, trustworthiness, good judgment)
- Guideline F — Financial Considerations (financial problems, unexplained wealth)
- Guideline G — Alcohol Consumption (excessive use, incidents)
- Guideline H — Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse (illegal drugs, prescription misuse)
- Guideline I — Psychological Conditions (conditions affecting judgment, reliability)
- Guideline J — Criminal Conduct (criminal behavior, convictions, arrests)
- Guideline K — Handling Protected Information (past security violations)
- Guideline L — Outside Activities (activities creating conflicts or vulnerabilities)
- Guideline M — Use of Information Technology (computer misuse, unauthorized access)
Each guideline specifies concerns (factors that raise security issues) and conditions that could mitigate the concerns. Adjudication evaluates the whole person across all guidelines rather than any single issue.
Whole-person concept
Under SEAD 4 Paragraph 2(b), adjudication applies the "whole-person concept" — consideration of all relevant circumstances, including:
- The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct
- The circumstances surrounding the conduct
- The frequency and recency of the conduct
- The individual's age and maturity at the time
- The extent to which participation is voluntary
- The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes
- The motivation for the conduct
- The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress
- The likelihood of continuation or recurrence
No single factor, including past criminal conduct or financial problems, automatically disqualifies an applicant. The adjudicator considers whether the conduct continues to raise concerns given time elapsed, evidence of changed behavior, and circumstances.
Bond Amendment disqualifiers
Under the Bond Amendment (Section 3002 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. 3343), certain categories of conduct result in mandatory denial for specific clearance levels:
- Conviction of a crime with sentence of more than 1 year — disqualifies from access to Special Access Programs, SCI, and any position requiring Q clearance
- Current user of illegal drugs (controlled substance as defined by the Controlled Substances Act) — disqualifies from security clearance at any level
- Mental incompetence declared by a court — disqualifies from classified information access
- Dishonorable discharge from the armed forces — disqualifies from classified information access
These are absolute disqualifiers not subject to whole-person mitigation. Waiver is available in some circumstances but requires specific agency head determination.
Adjudicative authorities
Adjudication is conducted by agency security or personnel security offices. For DoD civilians and military, the Consolidated Adjudications Services (part of DCSA) handles most adjudications. For intelligence community positions, specific agency adjudication authorities apply. For many other federal agencies, DCSA's Consolidated Adjudications Services provides adjudication services.
Processing timelines
Under current DCSA metrics, typical adjudication timelines (after investigation completion):
- Tier 3 (Secret) — adjudication typically 15-30 days
- Tier 5 (Top Secret) — adjudication typically 30-60 days
- SCI indoctrination — agency-specific, often 30-90 days after adjudication
Combined investigation-plus-adjudication timelines are published quarterly by DCSA. As of early 2026, DCSA reports significant improvements over the 2017-2019 backlog period, with most investigations completing within target windows.
Section VI Reciprocity between agencies
Reciprocity is the principle that a clearance granted by one federal agency should be accepted by another without unnecessary reinvestigation. In practice, reciprocity has significant limits that employees often encounter when moving between agencies or positions.
Statutory and regulatory framework
Reciprocity is governed by:
- E.O. 13467 (2008, as amended by E.O. 13488 and E.O. 13764) — Reforming Processes Related to Suitability, Fitness, and Credentialing
- E.O. 13549 — Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities
- SEAD 7 — Reciprocity of Background Investigations and National Security Adjudications (2018)
- 32 CFR Part 147 — Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
The core principle under E.O. 13467 Section 1.2 is that a background investigation or adjudicative determination completed by any agency should be accepted by any other agency for equivalent or lower-level access.
Baseline reciprocity — what transfers
Baseline reciprocity generally applies to:
- The underlying background investigation (once completed, should not be repeated)
- The security clearance at the same or lower level
- The favorable adjudicative determination
Under SEAD 7, the gaining agency may conduct limited adjudicative review but should not require a new investigation unless specific conditions apply.
Exceptions to reciprocity
Reciprocity does not apply automatically in these circumstances:
- Out-of-scope investigations — clearances where the underlying investigation exceeds the reinvestigation period (traditionally 5 years for TS, 10 years for Secret; now continuous vetting-based)
- Break in access — if the employee has been without clearance access for more than 24 months, a new investigation may be required
- New accesses — SCI indoctrination, SAP read-on, DOE Q/L are not automatically transferable; each requires specific agency process
- Polygraph requirements — if the new position requires polygraph and the existing clearance did not include one, a new polygraph is required
- Unfavorable information — if adverse information has come to light since the last adjudication, reciprocity may be denied pending review
- Position-specific requirements — certain positions have additional requirements beyond standard clearance (specific agency requirements, program read-ons)
Practical reciprocity challenges
Common reciprocity friction points in practice:
- Moving from DoD Secret to IC TS/SCI requires Tier 5 upgrade plus SCI indoctrination plus typically polygraph — effectively a new process
- Moving between different SAP programs typically requires separate read-on even when baseline clearance is identical
- DOE Q to DoD TS/SCI reciprocity requires adjudicative review and may require additional processes
- Contractor clearance transferring to civil service clearance (or vice versa) may trigger additional suitability review even though the underlying investigation is the same
Trusted Workforce 2.0 reciprocity goal
Under Trusted Workforce 2.0, the goal is "clear once, trusted everywhere" — effectively automated reciprocity for all national security clearances at the same level. Implementation targets include:
- Reduced reciprocity timelines from months to days or weeks
- Automated information sharing between agencies
- Unified adjudication standards reducing variance between agencies
- Centralized continuous vetting reducing need for reinvestigation at transfer
Full implementation continues through 2026-2027, contingent on NBIS deployment and agency adoption of Trusted Workforce 2.0 requirements.
Section VII Trusted Workforce 2.0 and the reform landscape
Trusted Workforce 2.0 (TW 2.0) is the governmentwide reform initiative modernizing federal personnel vetting. Understanding the reform landscape helps clearance holders navigate what is changing and what the changes mean.
Origins and objectives
TW 2.0 was initiated to address chronic problems in the pre-2019 clearance system:
- Massive backlogs (peaking at 725,000+ cases pending in 2018)
- Processing times averaging 250+ days for TS clearances
- Inconsistent reciprocity between agencies
- Periodic reinvestigation cycles producing outdated information between reviews
- Fragmented IT systems (e-QIP, JPAS, SWFT, legacy agency systems)
TW 2.0 objectives:
- Unified policy across DoD, IC, and civilian agencies
- Continuous vetting replacing periodic reinvestigations
- Streamlined reciprocity — "clear once, trusted everywhere"
- Modernized IT platform (NBIS) replacing legacy systems
- Consolidated investigation tiers (five tiers to three)
- Modernized adjudication standards
Key implementation milestones
TW 2.0 has progressed through several major milestones:
- 2019 — E.O. 13869 transferred background investigation responsibility from OPM to DoD
- October 1, 2019 — DCSA stood up, absorbing NBIB
- 2020-2023 — Continuous Vetting expanded across DoD, IC, and civilian agencies
- October 2023 — eApp became primary tool for initiating investigations
- December 2024 — All customer agencies transitioned to NBIS eApp
- Early 2026 — 3.8M+ cleared personnel enrolled in continuous vetting
- FY 2027 (projected) — Major NBIS development completion
NBIS — National Background Investigation Services
NBIS is the IT platform supporting TW 2.0. NBIS consolidates functions previously spread across:
- e-QIP (application form) — now replaced by eApp
- JPAS (Joint Personnel Adjudication System) — legacy DoD adjudication system
- SWFT (Secure Web Fingerprint Transmission)
- PSS (Personnel Security System) — DCSA adjudication platform
- Various agency-specific systems
NBIS provides an Individual Experience Portal (IEP) that allows cleared individuals to track case status, self-report information required under SEAD 3, and communicate with DCSA. As of March 2026, the IEP Status Tracker provides real-time visibility into case progress.
Continuous Vetting expansion
Continuous Vetting is the most impactful TW 2.0 change for clearance holders. CV operates through automated checks against multiple data sources on an ongoing basis. When an alert is generated (e.g., arrest, significant financial event, foreign travel), the agency security office reviews and may take action. CV enrollment:
- 2020-2022 — CV expanded across DoD military and civilian personnel
- 2023-2024 — Expansion to IC and civilian agency clearance holders
- Early 2026 — 3.8M+ cleared personnel enrolled
- Future — Expansion to non-sensitive public trust positions
For complete coverage of CV mechanics and self-reporting obligations, see Workplace Topic 35 on Continuous Vetting.
Position designation reform
Position designation — the process by which agencies determine the risk level and sensitivity of each position — is governed by 5 CFR Part 731 (for suitability) and 5 CFR Part 732 (for national security positions). Agencies use the OPM Position Designation Tool to assign appropriate tiers. Under TW 2.0, position designation is being standardized and linked directly to investigation tier requirements.
Implementation variability
While policy is unified, implementation varies across agencies:
- Some agencies have embraced automation and data-driven adjudication
- Others remain anchored to legacy workflows and conservative interpretations
- Contractor-focused agencies may lag federal civilian implementation
- Small agencies may rely entirely on DCSA services while larger agencies maintain internal capacity
This variability means an employee's experience with clearance processing depends significantly on the specific agency and position.
When navigating federal security clearances
- Identify your specific clearance level need based on position — Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, or TS/SCI. Public trust designations are separate.
- Understand the investigation tier that corresponds to your clearance — Tier 3 for Secret, Tier 5 for TS/SCI.
- Complete the SF-86 completely and accurately through NBIS eApp. Omissions or inconsistencies are the most common causes of extended investigation or denial.
- Preserve documentation of all foreign contacts, travel, financial issues, and other potentially reportable information — both for initial investigation and ongoing CV self-reporting.
- Understand your specific adjudicative guidelines under SEAD 4 — all 13 guidelines are considered, but specific guidelines (foreign influence, financial, personal conduct) are most commonly implicated.
- Track your case status through NBIS IEP Status Tracker once deployed.
- If transferring between agencies or positions, understand reciprocity — current clearances at same level should transfer, SCI/SAP indoctrination is separate, out-of-scope clearances may require reinvestigation.
- Maintain ongoing self-reporting obligations under SEAD 3 — foreign travel, foreign contacts, financial changes, arrests, and other reportable events must be reported to your agency security office.
- Keep personal records of all clearance-related documentation — SF-86 copies (maintain securely due to PII), adjudicative decisions, clearance certificates, access records.
- If adverse action is proposed against your clearance, consult with counsel immediately. See Workplace Topic 34 on Clearance Denial.
- Understand that clearance determinations under Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), are generally not reviewable by MSPB on the merits — only procedural compliance and the removal action are appealable.
Section VIII Frequently asked questions
Under Executive Order 13526 (Classified National Security Information, December 29, 2009), the three classification levels of national security information are Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. Each level reflects the degree of damage to national security that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause. Confidential applies when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security. Secret applies when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security. Top Secret applies when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. A security clearance at a given level authorizes access to classified information at that level and below — a Top Secret clearance permits access to Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential information. Above Top Secret are specialized access controls including Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which requires TS/SCI eligibility plus specific compartment briefings, and Special Access Programs (SAP), which require separate program-specific briefings even for TS-cleared individuals. DOE uses parallel Q (equivalent to TS) and L (equivalent to Secret) clearances for nuclear-related information.
Security clearances and public trust determinations address different risks and operate under different authorities. A security clearance, governed by E.O. 12968 and SEAD 4, determines eligibility for access to classified national security information (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, SCI, SAP). The risk being evaluated is harm to national security from unauthorized disclosure. A public trust determination, governed by 5 CFR Part 731, determines suitability for non-sensitive positions based on the potential risk of the position to the integrity or efficiency of federal service. Public trust levels include Low Risk (Tier 1), Moderate Risk (Tier 2), and High Risk (Tier 4). The risk being evaluated is damage to agency operations, public confidence, or financial integrity. The investigation depth differs — public trust investigations focus on suitability factors like criminal history, employment verification, and financial responsibility, while national security clearance investigations go deeper into foreign contacts, loyalty, and counterintelligence concerns. A federal employee may hold a public trust designation, a security clearance, or both simultaneously. The SF-85P form is used for public trust positions; the SF-86 is used for national security clearance investigations.
Under the 2012 Federal Investigative Standards (FIS), background investigations are organized into five tiers that correspond to position sensitivity and clearance level. Tier 1 is for Low Risk non-sensitive positions and HSPD-12 credentialing — the National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI) or equivalent. Tier 2 is for Moderate Risk public trust positions — typically a Moderate Background Investigation (MBI). Tier 3 is for non-critical sensitive positions and Secret clearances — the successor to the NACLC (National Agency Check with Law and Credit), including a Single Scope investigation focused on a 10-year scope. Tier 4 is for High Risk public trust positions — a deeper investigation than Tier 2 but parallel in risk focus to public trust rather than national security. Tier 5 is for Critical Sensitive and Special Sensitive positions, Top Secret clearances, and SCI access — the successor to the SSBI (Single Scope Background Investigation), covering a scope of up to 10 years and including field interviews with neighbors, coworkers, and references, subject coverage of foreign travel and contacts, and expanded financial scrutiny. Under proposals being implemented as part of Trusted Workforce 2.0, the five-tier model is consolidating toward a three-tier structure (Low, Moderate, High) but legacy tier terminology remains in use during the transition.
Clearance reciprocity, the principle that a clearance granted by one federal agency should be accepted by another without reinvestigation, is governed by Executive Order 13467 (as amended by E.O. 13488 and E.O. 13764), 32 CFR Part 147, and SEAD 7. Under reciprocity: an existing security clearance at the same or higher level should be accepted by the gaining agency without a new investigation, the gaining agency may still conduct adjudicative review but should not require a new background investigation unless specific conditions apply, reciprocity should generally be effective within weeks, not months. However, reciprocity has significant exceptions. Agencies may require additional investigation for: (1) clearances more than 2 years out of scope (older than the reinvestigation schedule), (2) positions requiring SCI access beyond a baseline TS clearance (SCI indoctrination is not automatically transferable), (3) positions requiring polygraph that the existing clearance did not include, (4) Special Access Program (SAP) positions, which have program-specific access controls. In practice, reciprocity works best for active clearances at the same level moving between agencies with similar requirements. Under Trusted Workforce 2.0, the goal is 'clear once, trusted everywhere' with automated reciprocity processing, though full implementation continues into 2026-2027.
Continuous Vetting (CV) is the automated, ongoing monitoring of cleared personnel that is replacing the traditional periodic reinvestigation cycle. Under Trusted Workforce 2.0, CV is being implemented governmentwide to replace the five-year reinvestigation schedule for Top Secret clearances and the ten-year schedule for Secret clearances. How CV works: automated checks against criminal records, financial records (credit bureaus, tax liens, bankruptcies), terrorism watchlists, foreign travel indicators, and public records are conducted on an ongoing basis rather than at fixed intervals. When an alert is generated, the agency reviews the information and may take action including investigation expansion, security officer consultation with the cleared individual, suspension of access pending resolution, or revocation in serious cases. As of early 2026, over 3.8 million cleared personnel are enrolled in continuous vetting, with DCSA expanding the program to include non-sensitive public trust positions. The transition means: periodic reinvestigations are no longer the primary monitoring mechanism, issues are identified and addressed much closer to occurrence (often within days of a triggering event rather than years later), and cleared individuals have stricter self-reporting obligations under SEAD 3. For complete coverage of continuous vetting mechanics, see Topic 35.